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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
SHEILA J. SHIPLER, 
Defendant/Appellant« 
Case No. 930164-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), and Utah R. Crim. 
P. 26(2)(a), whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action 
may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and 
conviction for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and rules are 
contained in the text of this brief or in Addendum A: 
Utah R. App. P. 3 
Utah R. Crim. P. 26 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) (Supp. 1992) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1983 & Supp. 1990) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (Supp. 1991) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(l)(b) (Supp. 1992) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court misinterpret the statutory authority 
which governs the reduction of a defendant's conviction to a lower 
category of offense? 
"Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Utah 
appellate courts review questions of law under a correction of error 
standard, without deference to the trial court." State v. Bagshaw, 
836 P.2d 1384, 1385 (Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted); accord 
State v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60 (Utah App. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order denying Ms. Shipler's 
motion to reduce her conviction to a misdemeanor in the Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, presiding. The trial court's order of 
denial was dated March 9, 1993. (R 58). The underlying conviction 
and the proceedings from which the reduction process stemmed were 
specifically noted by the court in its "Findings of Fact." See 
infra Statement of the Facts. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 9, 1993, the trial court denied Ms. Shipler's 
motion to reduce her conviction to a misdemeanor. The "Findings of 
Fact" accompanying the court's order of denial are reprinted below: 
1. That on October 22, 1990, the defendant entered a 
plea of "guilty" to the charge of Theft, a second 
degree felony; 
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2. That on November 19, 1990, the defendant was 
sentenced as a third-degree felony, pursuant to the 
provisions of § 76-3-402(1), Utah Code Ann. (1990), to 
serve, inter alia, the statutory term of zero-to-five 
years incarceration at the Utah State Prison; 
3. That on November 19, 1990, the Court suspended the 
imposition of sentence and placed the defendant on 
probation; and 
4. That on October 17, 1991, the Court terminated the 
defendants probation as successful without violation. 
(R 56-57). Also included in the November 19, 1990 sentencing order 
was "a term in the Utah State Prison . . . not to exceed five years; 
(Suspended)." (R 30). 
On December 2, 1992, counsel for Ms. Shipler moved to 
reduce her conviction to a class B misdemeanor pursuant to the 
mandate of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b) (1983 & Supp. 1990). 
(R 37). Following a continuance, the State opposed Ms. Shipler's 
motion and a hearing then was scheduled on the matter. (R 44-54). 
The trial court initially appeared inclined to grant her 
motion, asking the prosecutor "What harm is done [by granting the 
reduction]?" (R 86). Ms. Shipler paid back the funds in question 
and fully complied with her probation. (R 35, 86-87). In the end, 
however, the court denied her motion, reasoning: the "imposition of 
sentence" had never been stayed. (R 91-93). 
As more fully discussed below, the court's order was based 
on its interpretation of the statutory phrase, "[t]he imposition of 
the sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on probation[.]" 
(R 93); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b). Even though the zero-to-
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five year term had been stayed, and notwithstanding Adult Probation 
and Parole's recommendation to the court that Ms. Shipler's 
"Probation be terminated as successful[,]" (R 35), the trial court 
concluded that the statute did not apply. (R 93). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it refused to reduce 
Ms. Shipler's conviction to a misdemeanor. The mandate of the 
reduction statute is clear: "Whenever a conviction is for a felony, 
the conviction shall be deemed to be a misdemeanor if . . . [t]he 
imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on 
probation, . . . and [s]he is thereafter discharged without 
violating [her] probation." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b). In 
the case at bar, the trial court imposed a zero-to-five year prison 
sentence on Ms. Shipler. The court then stayed or suspended the 
prison term and placed her on probation. Upon her successful 
completion of probation, Adult Parole and Probation contacted the 
court with the recommendation that her probation be terminated. The 
conditions contained in the statute had been met and her reduction 
should have been granted. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REDUCING THE CONVICTION 
BECAUSE IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE HAD BEEN STAYED 
The statute governing the case at bar, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-402 (1983 & Supp. 1990) , reads in pertinent part: 
(2) Whenever a conviction is for a felony, the 
conviction shall be deemed to be a misdemeanor if: 
(b) The imposition of the sentence is stayed and 
the defendant is placed on probation, whether 
committed to jail as a condition of probation or 
notf and he is thereafter discharged without 
violating his probation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b) (emphasis added). 
The issue here centers around the meaning of "imposition of 
the sentence." According to the trial court, this statutory phrase 
did not apply to its sentencing order of November 19, 1990. (R 92); 
(R 30) (a copy of the court's "Judgment, Sentence [Commitment]" 
order is attached in Addendum B). The court believed that 
imposition of sentence had not been suspended. (R 93). 
Contrary to its claims, on November 19, 1990, the court 
sentenced Ms. Shipler "to a term in the Utah State Prison . . . not 
to exceed five years; (Suspended)." (R 30). The parathetical 
"Suspended" notation was typed in by the trial court. The order 
additionally read, "Defendant is granted a stay of the above prison 
sentence and placed on probation in the custody of this Court and 
under the supervision of [Adult Probation and Parole] . . . " (R 30) 
(emphasis added). 
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Despite this language, the trial court believed that it had 
only "executed sentence." (R 92); (R 93) ("I [the trial court] 
executed sentence. I did not suspend imposition of sentence."). 
However, the plain language of its order indicates that sentence was 
first imposed and then suspended pending completion of probation. 
Cf. State v. Bagshawf 836 P.2d at 1386 (Utah App. 1992) (citations 
omitted) ("Unambiguous language in [a] statute may not be 
interpreted to contradict its plain meaning"). 
If, as advocated by the State [and accepted by the court], 
imposition of sentence is stayed only when the term of imprisonment 
is not "set" by the sentencing order, (R 52), the sentencing 
provisions would be rendered meaningless. See also (R 52) (in its 
"Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Reduce Degree of 
Offense", the State claimed, "a sentence is imposed when the term of 
imprisonment or incarceration is set"). While a sentence "set" by 
the court may be an imposition, it does not follow that an "unset" 
sentence is stayed. (R 52). A sentence is not merely "stayed" when 
left unstated, the sentence does not exist. Moreover, if recognized 
such a "stayed sentence" would leave the "sentenced" person with no 
final order from which he or she could appeal. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18a-l(l)(b); Utah R. App. P. 3; Utah R. Crim. P. 26; Hinkins v. 
Santi, 25 Utah 2d 324, 481 P.2d 53 (1971). 
The flaw in the court/s ruling is further reflected by the 
following colloquy: 
[Counsel for Ms. Shipler]: Okay. And so the Court's 
finding, just so I am clear on this, is that . . . 
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THE COURT: [My November 19, 1990, order was an 
execution of the] sentence. I did not suspend 
imposition of sentence. 
[Counsel for Ms. Shipler]: Well, the Court did 
suspend it. Now, the statute says "stayed" — 
THE COURT: I suspended execution on any confinement. 
[Counsel for Ms. Shipler]: All right. 
THE COURT: And placed her on probation on the 
following terms and conditions. 
[Counsel for Ms. Shipler]: And so — 
THE COURT: The only thing I suspended was the 
execution on any prison sentence. 
[Counsel for Ms. Shipler]: Okay. The Courtis ruling 
is that because the imposition of sentence was not 
stayed, is that correct, that the subsection does not 
apply? 
THE COURT: Right. 
(R 92-93). 
The court's ruling suggests that the November 19, 1990, 
"Judgment, Sentence [Commitment]" order constituted both an 
"execution" and "suspension" of sentence. (R 30). According to the 
court, when it filled out the order, sentence was "executed.11 
(R 92). However, the very same actions or inactions also 
"suspended" imposition of the executed sentence. (R 92). 
Overlooked by the court is the fact that probation is a sentence, 
too. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1)(c). Under the court's 
interpretation of subsection (2)(b), a reduction could never occur 
because probation would first have to be "set." But a court could 
not set probation because if that were done, imposition of sentence 
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would not have been stayed. The reduction statute could never be 
triggered if, for example, a court "set" a sentence of a $100 fine, 
see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1)(a), and immediately stayed payment 
in favor of (the successful completion of) probation. Subsection 
(2)(b) should allow a reduction in such circumstances, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b), but the trial court's ruling would not. 
A distinction "between the suspension of the imposition and 
the suspension of the execution of a sentence. . ." finds no support 
in the plain meaning of the statute and would lead to absurd 
results. ^R 52); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b); State v. Baqshaw, 
836 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1992). Case law also does not warrant such 
an interpretation. 
For example, in Baqshaw, "defendant pled guilty to two 
counts of obtaining controlled substances by fraud. . . . 
Defendant's sentences were suspended and [she] was placed on 
probation for eighteen months." 836 P.2d 1384 (emphasis added). 
The trial court there, like the court here, noted parenthetically on 
its sentencing order that the prison term(s) were "suspended." See 
Addenda B & C. The courts in both cases also noted, "Defendant is 
granted a stay of the above prison sentence and placed on 
probation . . . " See Addenda B & C. 
Since Ms. Bagshaw's suspended prison term and her 
successful completion of probation fell squarely within subsection 
(2)(b), see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b) (1983 & Supp. 1990), the 
trial court reduced her convictions to class A misdemeanors. 
Baqshaw, 836 P.2d at 1384-85. On appeal, Ms. Bagshaw argued that 
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the reductions should have been to class B misdemeanors. This Court 
agreed, ruling that because the reduction statute failed to specify 
the category of misdemeanor intended, "defendant's two third degree 
felony convictions should be further reduced from class A to class B 
misdemeanor convictions." Bagshaw, 836 P.2d at 1386. 
Ms. Shipler's suspended prison term and her successful 
completion of probation should be treated no differently than 
Ms. Bagshaw's sentence, particularly since the trial court in both 
cases were the same.1 See Addenda B & C. 
The authority relied upon by the State is also not 
inconsistent with the proper interpretation of a "stayed" imposition 
of sentence. See (R 48-53) (State's "Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Reduce Degree of Offense") (citing Williams v. 
Harris, 149 P.2d 640 (Utah 1944); State v. Fedder, 262 P.2d 753 
(Utah 1953); State v. Janis, 597 P.2d 873 (Utah 1979); State v. 
Garnick, 619 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1980)). In each cited case, probation 
played a critical role in the proceedings. Although the involved 
trial courts may have suspended the imposition of a prison sentence, 
the courts nonetheless "set" sentence by imposing a period of 
probation. To say that in those cases the "imposition of sentence" 
was "stayed" would be to ignore the order imposing probation and the 
1 The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presided over the trial 
court in Bagshaw and in the case at bar. Compare Addendum B with 
Addendum C. In Bagshaw, however, the court did not contend that 
imposition of sentence had not been stayed. When Ms. Shipler's 
motion was presented, the court changed its position and its reading 
of the reduction statute. 
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accompanying restrictions and conditions which the defendants were 
required to adhere to.2 The trial court's reading of the statute 
and its ruling that subsection (2)(b) did not apply is subject to 
correction. 
2 The trial court's ruling also ignored the State's 
argument, "I don't think the legislature ever intended a defendant 
to be able to reduce their conviction twice, once at sentencing and 
again." (R 85, 91-93). The statute relied on by the State, Utah 
Code Ann. section 76-3-402 (Supp. 1991), is inapplicable to the case 
at bar. The more restrictive amendments became effective on 
April 29, 1991, five months after the November 19, 1990, sentencing 
order. By contrast, the unamended version of the statute and the 
language in effect at the time of the 1990 sentencing was Utah Code 
Ann. section 76-3-402 (1983 & Supp. 1990). See (R 30); (R 6-7) 
(1990 was the date alleged in the Information); Harris v. Smith, 541 
P.2d 343 (Utah 1975) (emphasis in original) ("In State v. Miller we 
held that the law in force at the time of sentencing governed and in 
Belt v. Turner we held that an amendment to the statute passed after 
sentence had been imposed had no effect on the matter"); State v. 
Miller, 24 Utah 2d 1, 464 P.2d 844 (1970); Belt v. Turner, 25 Utah 
2d 230, 479 P.2d 791, on reh'q, 25 Utah 2d 380, 483 P.2d 425 (1971); 
compare (R 89-90) (a misdemeanor reduction at the 1990 sentencing 
would have been proper), with State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470 (Utah 
App. 1991) ("the defendant's sentence . . . [may] be remanded for 
resentencing 'because of the clear error in the original 
[sentence].'") 
Nothing in the 1983 statute prohibits a two degree 
reduction. In fact, subsection (2) of the statute mandates a 
reduction following one of two stated occurrences. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-402 (1983 & Supp. 1990); State v. Baqshawf 836 P.2d 1384 
(Utah App. 1992). "[S]tatutory interpretation 'must be based on the 
language used, . . . and the court has no power to rewrite a statute 
to make it conform to an intention not expressed." Cox Rock 
Products v. Walker Pipeline Constr., 754 P.2d 672, 676 (Utah App. 
1988) (quoting Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 107 Utah 502, 502 155 P.2d 184, 185 (Utah 1945)); accord 
Bagshaw, 836 P.2d at 1385-86 ("where statutory language is clear and 
unambiguous, Utah courts do not look to legislative intent"). The 
legislature did not amend the reduction statute or express a 
contrary intent until 1991. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (Supp. 
1991). The limitations now reflected by the 1991 amendments are 
separate and apart from the requirements of the 1983 enactment. 
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In summary, on November 19, 1990, the trial court sentenced 
Ms. Shipler "to a term in the Utah State Prison . . . not to exceed 
five years; (Suspended),11 (R 30). The court granted Ms. Shipler "a 
stay of the above (prison) sentence and placed [her] on 
probation. . ." (R 30). Following Ms. Shipler's adherence to, and 
successful completion of the conditions of her probation, Adult 
Probation and Parole notified the court and recommended that her 
probation be terminated. (R 35). The reduction statute could not 
have been more aptly worded for the circumstances at hand. "The 
imposition of [Ms. Shipler7s] sentence [was] stayed and [she was] 
placed on probation[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b). 
Since Ms. Shipler complied with the plain language of the 
statute and because the reduction to a misdemeanor is mandatory, see 
id. ("the conviction shall be deemed to be a misdemeanor"), her 
conviction should be reduced to a class B misdemeanor. State v. 
Baqshaw, 836 P.2d at 1386 (Utah App. 1992) (under the 1990 version 
of the reduction statute, "[w]here the code fails to specify the 
category of misdemeanor intended, it 'is a class B misdemeanor'"). 
- 11 -
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Sheila Shipler respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court's order of denial and reduce her conviction 
to a class B misdemeanor. 
SUBMITTED this 23 day of June, 1993. 
ROtfALD S.xFtiJI J NO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that I have caused eight 
copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, and two copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 27> day of June, 1993. 
RONALD S. PI UJINO 
DELIVERED by 




APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF 
TRIAL COURTS. 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be 
taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with 
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as 
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the 
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take 
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court 
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sane* 
tions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
353 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 26 
Rule 26. Appeals. 
(1) An appeal is taken by filfag with the clerk of the court from which the 
appeal is taken a notice of appeal, stating the order or judgment appealed 
from, and by serving a copy of it on the adverse party or his attorney of record. 
Proof of service of the copy shall be filed with the court 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the fr"fll judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of 
the defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when, upon petition for review, the appellate 
court decides that the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental 
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution. 
77-18a-l. Appeals — When proper. 
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of 
the defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review the appellate 
court decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental 
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution. 
SENTENCING 
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed 
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Definitions — 
Resentencing — Aggravation or mitigation of 
crimes with mandatory sentences. 
(1) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
• • — - - . - % * % I - * . . — — : x l ^ , _ 
Utah Code Ann. 3 e c . 7 6 - 3 - 4 0 2 f \HZS + $0??. l<V\o\ 
76-3-402. Conviction of lower category of offense. 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the of-
fense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and charac-
ter of the defendant, concludes that it would be unduly harsh to record the 
conviction as being for that category of offense established by statute and to 
sentence the defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, 
the court may, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, enter a judgment 
of conviction for the next lower category of offense and impose sentence ac-
cordingly. 
(2) Whenever a conviction is for a felony, the conviction shall be deemed to 
be a misdemeanor i£ 
(a) The judge designates the sentence to be for a misdemeanor and the 
sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a misdemeanor; 
or 
(b) The imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed 
on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of probation or not, 
"and he is thereafter discharged without violating his probation. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude any person from 
obtaining or being granted an expungement of his record as provided by law. 
Utah Cade Ann. S e c . 7 6 - 3 - 4 0 2 {$0?'?* l^Hl ) 
76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense. 
(1) If the court, having regard to the mature and circumstances of the of-
fense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and charac-
ter of the defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the convic-
tion as being for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence 
the defendant to an alternative nonzially applicable to that offense, the court 
may unless otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of convic-
tion for the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction is considered to 
be for a class A misdemeanor i£ 
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A misdemeanor 
and the sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a class 
A misdemeanor; or 
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is 
placed on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of pro-
bation or not; 
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his 
probation; and 
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney, 
and a hearing if requested by either party or the court, finds it is in 
the interest of justice that the conviction be considered to be for a 
class A misdemeanor, 
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section unless the 
prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense 
may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced under this 
section by more than two degrees. 
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any person from obtain-
ing or being granted an expungement of his record as provided by law. 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
Plaintiff. . (COMMITMENT) 
vs. I Case No. 9019Q1599 FS 
f Count No. two 
SHIPLER. SHEILA J. \ Honorable KENNFTH KTKTKTT? 
( Clerk Constance George 
DOB; 7/28/64
 t 1 Reporter Carlton Way 
Bailiff Stan Jacobson 
Ort.nd.nt D.t. N.v«.ber 19, 1990 
ft 
» 
• The motion of R. Scowcrctfetenter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is • granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant havingbeen convicted by D a jury; D the court; • plea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of ^ h e f t a felony 
of the *>** degree, D a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented hyp Q m w m f f and the State being represented by T VuyV is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; d \ \Q \ cX/O / 
k^r m not to exceed five years; (Suspended). i i r\ i __Q r\ o ^ o -
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; \ r < x O i O * 0*2C5 a ' r v v ^ 
$ 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
tfp m and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $- i l£2£lS° $ 6 0 ( K **? w o r k o f f t h r u Co™/Ser at $5.Hr 
* and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to ^ e 0 n r a ^ fnT ? flawing 
B De f t to pav $250.00 Vir-tim Kefiff fuMnTi Agspgs 7 P P . & $700 .00 Barmipomo^t V** +„ JJD A 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
• upon motion of • State, Q Defense, Q Court, Count(s) L J L J are hereby dismissed. 
D 
uP, ft Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of 36 months , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
O Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County a for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
D Commitment shall issue 
DATED this _21st<Jay of Novemi 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page i of J : 
(White—Court) (Green—Judge) (YeHow—Jatl/PnsonMP&P) (Pink—Defense) (Goldenrod—State) 
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Judgment/State v. SHIPLER, SHEILA J. fCR /Honorable KENNETH RIGTRUP 
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
D# 9 Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept. of Adult Probation & Parole. 
O Serve — — 
in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing 
$/ m Pay a fine in the amount of $100° -> at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and
 r 
Parole; or D at the rate of ($600.00 may be worked o f f at the ra te Sg.OO Hr.~*fooyk ( W ^ (**#** 
(' • Pay restitution in the amount of $ — ; or Otin afiamgunt to be determined by the Department <# Adult 
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of ^ *^~ZX* u*#-
 ; 0r D at a rate to be determined by 
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole, (reserved for hearing) 
}^ • Enter, participate in, and complete any ffefltal Health » program, counseling, or treatment as 
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole/* 'U/JuJ^ i*JLd*Z+ 
D Enter, participate in, and complete the program at 
D Participate in and complete any D educational; and/or D vocational training D as directed by the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or D with 
D Participate in and complete any training D as directed by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole; or D with -
O Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs. 
D Submit to drug testing. 
D Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs. 
D Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally. 
D Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances. 
D Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
D Submit to testing for alcohol use. 
D Take antabuse D as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment. 
' V Maintain full-time employment. 
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling. 
Q Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling. 
D Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with 
D Defendant's probation may be transferred to under the Interstate Compact as approved 
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Complete hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole. 
D Complete hours of community service restitution in lieu of days in jail. 
Tfi. Defendant is to commit no crimes. 
D Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on _ _ f o r a review of this sentence 
• T l » f P n H g r H - f -n p a y $ 7 0 0 . 0 0 P p r m i p o m p ^ f Vaa f n TT1A 
T ^ p f p n H ^ r t ^ m p a y $ 9 5 0 OO Vlnfl-m T ? o e f i > n H n n A « " ? m t ??* 
/ Q p f g n H a n r fn n n f n<aP n f pnccpc^ any rrorH r r a r H c anr4/^T- ~*)~~YlT\£ acCQUTltC ? tC 
D 
D 
DATED this *>} day of 
2 
Page * of 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
KENNETH RIGTRUP 
00031 
S T A T E OP" U T A H 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE 
PROGRESS/VIOWrON REPORT 
TO: THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT REGARDING: Shipler, Sheila Joy 
Salt Lake County, Utah _
 m9mmm 
ATTN: Judge Kenneth Rigtrup CASE NO.: 9019015ftfl;d Judicial District 
FROM: Field Operations/Region III OFFENSE: npj 4 7 jggj 
DATE: August 21, 1991 **iru«COUNTY 
PROBATION DATE: November 21, 1990 OBSCIS: 00059Q&*— k r * Y^ £>«&-** 
EMPLOYMENT: West Valley Child Care ADDRESS: 5720 W. 3575 S. 
5720 W. 3575 S.; West Valley City, UT 84120 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Robert Scowcroft 
COMMENTS: On November 21, 1990, the defendant was ordered 36 months 
probation with the following special conditions: 
1. Usual/ordinary conditions of 36 months probation; 
2. Pay $1000-00 fine; 
3. Pay restitution in the amount $5000.00; 
4. Enter, participate in and complete mental health substance abuse 
counseling; 
5. Maintain full-time employment; 
6. Commit no new crimes; 
7. Pay $200.00 to Legal Defender's Association; 
8. Pay $250.00 to Victim Restitution Assessment Fee; 
9. No checking account or credit cards while on probation. 
As of August 9, 1991, the defendant reports monthly and has satisfied all 
special conditions of her probation. 
IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN BY AGENT: NOTIFY THE COURT AND SUPERVISOR. 
RECOMMENDATION: Probation be terminated as successful. 
1€ Lanchard, SUPERVISOR Teague Eskelson, PROBATiON/OFF-T 
APPROVED AND ORDERED: fcg&jil 





IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTA 
— N l & B I M J U U UIK?S7 
iCOUNTY 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
r, SENTENCE JUDGMENT ENT  
Plaintiff.
 v (COMMITMENT) 
MrtfltfiM FS vs. I Case No. 
Honorable f^nn gTn Tftg-feup 
! J _ , , ( Clerk flr»AK-M#J/t*. U.&OtO*. 
JVTP»» 3-?1-(o) \ Reporter h\<tt W+nti 
Bailiff & f a n Tarnfe t fN / 
Defendant ' Date f ] n / f j fl/, W 
O The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is Q granted 0 denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by 0 a jury: Q the court: j£ plea of guilty: 
O plea of no contest: of the offense *»fflfrttthing Or*riroMSub&noe.lu^ felony 
LdX of the -*2cd degree, D a class _ misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented *yn&±'jikiiimau and the State being represented ty&lenilQaski js.now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
a to a maximum mandatory term of _ _ _ _ _ years and which may be for life: 
t ^ - X not to exceed five years: (SU&pjnded) C o a M < X . g ^ q Q O o n 
Q of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years: cs Q C V - * CN 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life: O * 0 ~ o f t - O ^ o l 0 - " * " ^ . 
[/£- * n o t to exceed ^ f r — y e a r s : (Suspended) J OLMt 3P ^ f . 
tjfa*X and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of « IM**' mnjj (j^EK Of? *3CD~* 4.flW»* HMU | g W 
O and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of S to _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
tffrjC INivfen^nf +*H2JL[ S/5S.c*Vtfl1/rto fr<+fttK/r>ri /L«gSS/WgM< ass 
Q such sentence is to run concurrently with _ _ _ _ _ ,,,_, 
YD. J* such sentence is to run consecutively with ,Z*w. . *» dA*t C^^zt^ 
a upon motion of a State, C Defense, O Court. Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
D 
&s J6 Defendant is granted a stay of the above (X prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent. Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of Jfe fHO/VT-fiS pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
O Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County Q for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper. Utah, or C for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment 
D Commitment shall issue * 
JzTdayof M ^ , DATED this _=*ZTd  o
APPROVED AS TO FORM: M"^u JXST/ 
Defense Counsel 
^OISTRICT COllRTtfUDGE 
Deputy County Attorney Page / of 
